An article by Gen VP Malik, Ex Chief.
13
Years After Kargil War
General
(Retd) V P Malik
The strength of a military force lies
in the quality of its human resource, weapons and equipment, and its morale.
There is no better time to reiterate this than now, exactly 13 years
after the Kargil war.
Twenty days after
taking over as Army Chief, while addressing the Prime Minister and his CCS
colleagues in a Combined Commanders’ Conference (October 20, 1997), I had
described the state of the army as ‘the spirit is strong but the body is weak’,
and then proceeded to indicate the high deficiencies of arms, ammunition and
equipment.
In March 1999, just
before Kargil war, I wrote to Defense Minister George Fernandes stating “The
army is finding that major acquisitions get stymied for various reasons and a
feeling of cynicism is creeping in. By and large, the prevailing situation is
that nothing much can be done about the existing hollowness in the army. By
denying essential equipment, the armed forces would gradually lose their combat
edge which would show adversely in a future conflict...”
And then in May 1999,
despite the Lahore Agreement, Pakistan surprised us strategically and
tactically. Before melting of the snows, Pakistan Army units lodged themselves
on several heights in Kargil and Southern Siachen sectors to dominate the
Srinagar-Kargil-Leh highway. When the fog of war cleared and reality emerged
that the intruders were not Mujahideen but Pakistan Army units, the whole
nation was shocked.
During the war, while
briefing the media, a journalist asked me as to how the army was going to fight
in the face of its severe weapons and equipment shortages. My spontaneous reply
was: ‘We shall fight with whatever we have.’ Someone from the Ministry
of Defence complained to the Prime Minister about my statement. He asked me
whether I should have made such a remark. I explained that my response was to a
direct question from a journalist. Any attempt to cover up the true state of
affairs would have conveyed an impression to the army rank and file that their
Chief was indulging in double talk. If that happens, they would lose confidence
in me.
To get away from long
faces and depression in New Delhi and to boost my own morale, I went to the
Kargil and Siachen front and addressed troops regularly. Interacting with them
and seeing their commitment and motivation, I would get re-assured.
When the Prime
Minister asked a wounded Garhwali soldier in Srinagar hospital what can he do
for him, the response was “I want to rejoin my battalion as soon as possible”
and “Please get us some lighter weapons and equipment so that we can climb
mountains much faster.”
The spirit was
strong; the morale high. We were confident that we would throw the intruders
out from Kargil and Siachen sectors. And if the situation demanded, we could
also attack across the border.
Looking back,
however, I cannot help wondering that if we had the required quantity and
quality of weapons and equipment; would Pakistan Army have dared to attack us
in Kargil or would we have suffered that many casualties?
How has the situation
changed today? Let me deal with the weapons and equipment state first.
On 12 March 2012,
former Chief of Army Staff wrote a letter to the Prime Minister ruefully
informing him that the army’s air defense weapon systems were obsolete, the
infantry was deficient of crew served weapons and lacked night fighting
capabilities, and its tank fleet was devoid of critical ammunition. He alleged
that there was ‘hollowness in the procedures and processing time for
procurements as well as legal impediments by vendors’.
For the military and
informed strategic community, there was nothing new in this letter. The
surprise was that none of our worthy politicians, bureaucrats or media persons
owned up that this was a chronic problem which had dogged the nation for
decades. The Government had failed to rectify it.
Publication of this
letter in the media created a furore in the Parliament and outside: less
due to its serious strategic implications, more because a classified letter
from the Army Chief to the Prime Minister had been leaked.
What about the
military spirit?
In the recent past,
we have witnessed an unhealthy row over the age of the last Army Chief,
attempted bribe to purchase Tatra vehicles from BEML, and the deep-lying
suspicion of the military over movement of some units for training near Delhi.
The last mentioned incident reflects the lack of trust that continues to bother
officials in the Government after 65 years of independence and after what the
armed forces have contributed for the nation.
There is deep
discontent among the armed forces veterans and widows. They feel cheated over
pension disparities and anomalies. As a result, they have been organizing
rallies, fast unto death agitations, and surrender of war and gallantry medals
to the President to draw public and political attention. Less visible is the unhappy
feeling among serving soldiers over automatic promotion and up gradation rules
that the civil services have managed to secure for themselves. The general
impression is that the political leadership takes little or no interest in the
armed forces’ welfare and to protect their hierarchal status in the government
and society.
A few days ago, the
Prime Minister announced a Committee under the Cabinet Secretary to look into
these anomalies and grievances. Against all organizational norms, the Committee
had only civil secretaries as members; no representation from the military.
The Government may have forgotten
Kargil war but in military history, it will go down as a saga of unmatched
bravery, grit and determination. The army responded with alacrity and with its
characteristic steadfastness and perseverance. How will it fight the next one?
Not differently. Because the Indian soldier is a remarkable human being:
spiritually evolved, mentally stoic and sharp, physically hardy and skilled.
And his institution remains proud of its traditions of selflessness, devotion
to duty, sacrifice and valour.
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THE END
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